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ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE AND THE
HOSPITAL ENTERPRISE
WILLIAM S. BREWBAKER U*
The smoke-filled room is a poor metaphor for the formal, clinical
atmosphere associated with hospital decision making. Nevertheless, the
routine decisions of a hospital and its doctors to grant, deny, or revoke
medical staff admitting privileges can result in charges of antitrust con-
spiracy and anticompetitive conduct.' The prospect that hospitals and
* Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A., Vanderbilt
University, 1981; J.D., University of Virginia, 1986; LL.M., Duke University, 1993.
This Article was written in large part while I was enrolled at Duke University School
of Law as a candidate for an LL.M. degree in Health Care Law. I am grateful to
Clark Havighurst for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Dean
Kenneth Randall, former Dean Nathaniel Hansford, and the University of Alabama
Law School Foundation for generous support permitting the completion of this
Article.
1 Only recently have courts begun to apply antitrust analysis to the health care
industry. Prior to Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), courts had held
that learned professions, such as law, medicine, and engineering, did not constitute
"trade or commerce" and thus enjoyed an exemption from the antitrust laws. In
Goldfarb, however, the United States Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this
notion. Id. at 786-88. Subsequent cases have confirmed the applicability of antitrust
law to the health care industry. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 465-66 (1986) (upholding FTC decision that dentists' agreement to withhold X-
rays from insurers violated antitrust law); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 29-31 (1984) (applying federal antitrust law to exclusive contract between
anesthesiologists and hospital); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 348-49 (1982) (condemning price-fixing agreement among physicians); see also
Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of Health Care Considerations in Antitrust
Analysis, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, 273, 285 ("The Supreme Court's
trilogy of health care antitrust cases following Goldfarb-[Maricopa, Jefferson Parish,
and Indiana Federation]-leaves little doubt about the general applicability of the
antitrust laws to health care activities and considerable doubt about how they are
applied.").
Goldfarb also is important for its conclusion that the anticompetitive restraints in
the market for professional services can substantially affect interstate commerce so as
to justify federal jurisdiction. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 783-86 (noting the volume of
commerce involved and the link of the services in question to interstate commerce);
see also Clark C. Havighurst, A Comment: The Antitrust Challenge to Professionalism,
41 MD. L. REV. 30, 31 (1981) (arguing that lack of jurisdiction, rather than the nonap-
plicability of antitrust law to professionals, was the primary reason for the professions'
longstanding antitrust immunity). The "interstate commerce" jurisdictional require-
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physicians might face treble damages for credentialing decisions has gen-
erated concerns that patients might be endangered because staff physi-
cians and hospitals would hesitate to curtail the privileges of incompetent
practitioners.2 On the other hand, access to hospital facilities is essential
for modern medical practice, and excluded health care providers have
offered credible allegations of anticompetitive conduct in the peer review
process.3
Antitrust claims arise out of staff privileges decisions because of the
way hospitals are organized. Generally, a hospital's governing board del-
egates the right to make decisions about clinical privileges and other
medical matters to the physicians serving on the hospital's medical staff.
The justification for this division of authority within the hospital is that
only trained professionals should make judgments about medical matters,
and especially about the performance or qualifications of a physician. For
antitrust purposes, however, medical staff physicians are not merely pro-
fessional colleagues, but also independent practitioners with their own
economic interests to protect. Some of them may even be in direct com-
petition with the practitioners whose competence they are evaluating.4 In
ment is no longer a significant obstacle to plaintiffs in staff privileges-related antitrust
cases. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1991) (holding that
alleged restraint's effect on interstate commerce should be "measured, not just by a
particularized evaluation of [the physician's] own practice, but rather, by a general
evaluation of the impact of the restraint on other participants in the market from
which he has been excluded"); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738, 741 (1976) (finding plaintiff's complaint alleged a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce when hospital, among other things, received a substantial portion of its
supplies, revenue, and patients from out-of-state sources).
2 To alleviate the fear among physicians of antitrust litigation, Congress enacted
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100
Stat. 3784 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988 & Supp. III 1991))
(limiting damages when professional review process conforms to specified guidelines).
Because potential plaintiffs may view the immunity that the HCQIA grants to be
quite limited, the legislation apparently has not significantly decreased litigation
against hospitals and physicians. See Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Peer Review
and the Antitrust Laws, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1117, 1162-63 (1986) (noting that
the HCQIA "create[s] some new opportunities for litigating at length the true
motives of peer reviewers").
3 The claims presenting the most obvious anticompetitive motivations have been
those involving nonphysician practitioners. See, e.g., Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hib-
bett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990) (nurse midwives), cert. denied sub nor. Nurse Mid-
wifery Assocs. v. Hendersonville Community Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Weiss v.
York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984) (osteopaths), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060
(1985).
4 Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Tradi-




these situations, it is not difficult for an excluded physician to raise the
specter of anticompetitive activity.
Despite the potential for anticompetitive activity inherent in the staff
privileges decision-making process, several federal courts of appeals have
held that a hospital and its staff physicians are incapable of concerted
action-"antitrust conspiracy"-under § 1 of the Sherman Act5 because
concerted action, by definition, implies group conduct. 6 These courts typ-
ically have compared medical staff participation in hospital decision mak-
ing with the role executive officers play in conventional firms, where
intrafirm decision making by multiple persons has been held not to
destroy the unilateral nature of firm conduct.7 Accordingly, most courts
5 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
6 The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have held that medical staff members are
capable of antitrust conspiracy among themselves, but that the hospital is incapable of
engaging in concerted action with its medical staff in the peer review process.
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 702-08 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992); Nurse Midwifery Assocs., 918 F.2d at 614; Weiss, 745
F.2d at 813-17.
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes both the capacity of medical staff members to con-
spire among themselves and the capacity of the hospital to engage in concerted action
with medical staff members. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819
(11th Cir.) (criticizing Weiss), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990). The Ninth Circuit has
held that medical staff members are capable of antitrust conspiracy among them-
selves. Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), affd on
other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991).
Inability to conspire is one of several grounds upon which courts have rested dis-
missal of staff privileges-related antitrust complaints against the health care industry.
In addition to dismissing claims for lack of jurisdiction, see supra note 1, courts have
also used the state action doctrine to dismiss cases on the theory that medical staff
decision making in the hospital embodies state regulatory policy. E.g., Doe v. St.
Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding dismissal of antitrust
claim when hospital suspended physician's staff privileges pursuant to state peer
review statute). The Supreme Court, however, has held that immunity under the state
action doctrine requires significant state control over the peer review decisions of
private hospitals. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1988) (finding state action
doctrine inapplicable when state officials could not and did not exercise ultimate
authority regarding hospital privileges). However, public hospitals, particularly those
with the characteristics of a "municipality," may have a stronger claim under the state
action doctrine. See Todorov v. DCH Health Care Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1459-62
(11th Cir. 1991) (dismissing antitrust claim when public hospital's charter expressly
recognized power of hospitals to make anticompetitive decisions).
7 See, e.g., Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 703 (suggesting that medical staff worked as hospi-
tal's agent in implementing hospital's policies); Weiss, 745 F.2d at 817 (comparing role
of medical staff to corporate officers and noting that the staff, as an entity, had no
interest in competition with the hospital).
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have held that a so-called "vertical" agreement between the hospital and
its medical staff does not constitute concerted action.8 The same courts
have also usually held that "horizontal" agreements among medical staff
physicians rarely amount to concerted conduct if the agreement occurs
within regular hospital channels for making staff privileges decisions.9
This Article evaluates antitrust conspiracy doctrine in medical staff
privileges litigation. Its thesis is that given the typical economic and man-
agerial independence of physicians from hospitals, courts are usually
wrong to view hospital decision making regarding medical staff privileges
as the equivalent of decision making within a single, integrated firm.
Except in the unusual case when staff physicians' medical practices and
hospital operations are significantly integrated,' ° traditional hospital gov-
erning structures create the risk of anticompetitive physician conduct. In
the typical case, hospital decisions involving medical staff participation
should escape scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act only if it can be
demonstrated that the medical staff acted in a purely advisory role."
8 See supra note 6.
9 Bolt, 891 F.2d at 819; see Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 706 (finding no conspiracy when
staff members' actions occurred in peer review process); Cooper v. Forsyth County
Hosp. Auth., 789 F.2d 278, 282 n.14 (4th Cir. 1986) ("That the challenged conduct of
the appellants is consistent with legitimate activities also weighs against inferring a
conspiracy."); infra note 82.
The mere fact that physicians act through the existing structures of the peer review
process in denying staff privileges should not preclude a finding of concerted conduct.
The conclusion that medical staff members are capable of conspiracy with each other
necessarily suggests that they are separate economic actors whose joint decisions
should be seen as the product of concerted conduct. As Part I of this Article suggests,
the relevant issue is whether actors with divergent economic interests are engaged in
concerted decision making.
10 Market trends encouraging physicians and hospitals to network their services
are producing more integration and risk-sharing among hospitals and their staff physi-
cians. See Howard S. Zuckerman et al., Principles of Health Care Facility Organiza-
tion and Management, in HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND
REGULATION 2-22 to 2-23 (Mark A. Hall ed., 1993) (describing new models of medi-
cal staff organization).
11 This Article does not attempt to delineate the appropriate standard for analyz-
ing staff privileges decisions under the applicable antitrust law. For a thorough dis-
cussion of this issue, see 2 JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST LAW
§ 10.05[4] (1992); James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer
Review, LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS., Spring 1988, at 7, 78-82; Havighurst, supra note 4,
at 1108-39; Philip C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Con-
ventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV. 595, 643-71 (1982).
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I. PIERCING THE ENTERPRISE VEIL:' 2 ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY
DOCTRINE AND DECISION MAKING IN HOSPITALS
Conspiracy is a feature of substantive antitrust law only because the
Sherman Act treats multiple parties who restrain trade differently than
single entities who do so. i3 Plaintiffs must bring claims against a single
actor under § 2 of the Sherman Act 4 and cannot succeed unless the chal-
lenged restraint threatens "actual monopolization."'" Plaintiffs alleging
concerted action, on the other hand, must bring claims under § 1, which
requires a showing that the alleged activities unreasonably restrain
trade.
16
Recognizing that it is easier to prove that a challenged restraint is
unreasonably anticompetitive than that it threatens monopolization, law-
yers representing antitrust plaintiffs sometimes attempt to attribute the
conduct of a single firm to the concerted activity of intrafirm decision
makers. They may argue, for example, that agreements between a firm
and its corporate division or subsidiary amount to concerted action sub-
ject to scrutiny under § 1.1 In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
12 See Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 497, 506-11 (1992) (citing examples of antitrust law's willingness to look behind
formal corporate structures).
13 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984)
(justifying distinction because of increased risk that concerted behavior will have
anticompetitive effects).
14 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
15 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767; see also Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct.
884, 890 (1993) (citing Copperweld).
16 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768. It is somewhat surprising that the legality of
anticompetitive conduct frequently depends on whether the conduct is the product of
unilateral, as opposed to concerted, action. The anticompetitive effect of a particular
restraint is less a function of the number of firms implementing it than of the firm or
firms' aggregate power in the market. A single, powerful firm imposing a restraint is
more likely to restrain trade than a group of firms with less aggregate market influ-
ence instituting the same practice. See id. at 774 (noting that the distinction between
concerted action and unilateral action may be arbitrary). Nevertheless, the Sherman
Act gives greater latitude to single firms than it does to combinations of competitors
because concerted action may signal anticompetitive behavior and because subjecting
the day-to-day activities of a single firm to antitrust scrutiny may dampen the firm's
"competitive zeal." Id. at 767-68.
1 See, e.g., Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 953 (2d Cir. 1982)
(alleging conspiracy among corporate executives); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger,
Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969) (alleging conspiracy between grocery chain and its
wholly-owned, unincorporated sales division).
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Corp.,'8 the United States Supreme Court recognized that permitting
plaintiffs to bring § 1 claims against single firms on the basis of
"intraenterprise" conspiracies threatened to undermine Congress's intent
to treat concerted and unilateral activity differently. 9 Consequently, the
Court held that § 1 analysis is inappropriate when there is a complete
unity of economic interest between a parent firm and intraenterprise
actors and when the parent may assert full control at any time.2" Apply-
ing this test to staff privileges decisions, a hospital would be incapable, as
a matter of law, of conspiring with its medical staff only when: (1) the
two share a unity of economic interest; and (2) the hospital could exert
full control over decisions about staff admitting privileges.
2 '
A. Conflicts of Economic Interests Within the Hospital Enterprise
The Copperweld inquiry focuses first on whether there is a conflict of
economic interests among the parent firm and the alleged conspirators.22
In the ordinary business firm, intraenterprise decision makers do not
have a separate presence in markets affected by firm activities. The deci-
sion makers have no personal incentive not to pursue the firm's best
interests. Thus, it makes good economic sense to treat their decisions as
those of the corporate entity acting alone. When, however, decision mak-
ers retain an independent presence in a market affected by firm activities,
they may be tempted to skew firm decision making to further their per-
sonal interests. The presence of economic conflict among the firm and
the decision makers justifies removing the presumption that decisions
reflect solely the firm's interests and permitting judicial scrutiny of the
reasonableness of any resulting restraint under § 1.
The success of hospitals and medical staff physicians in persuading
courts to view medical staff decision making as the hospital's unilateral
18 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
19 Id. at 776.
20 Id. at 771; see also Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 11, at 39-41 (suggesting that
Copperweld requires both full control and unity of interest for immunity under § 1).
21 In Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992), the Fourth Circuit noted that a "unity of interest is
present in the relationship between the hospital and its staff, both of which seek to
upgrade the quality of patient care." Id. at 703. The Supreme Court's emphasis on
economic interests, however, suggests that this type of "unity" is not sufficient. Cf
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769 (noting the danger of the "sudden joining of economic
resources" when two firms conspire (emphasis added)); id. at 771 (stating that "[t]he
officers of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic
interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together economic power
that was previously pursuing divergent goals" (emphasis added)). Although a hospi-
tal and its medical staff may share the goal of improving patient care, the appropriate
inquiry in terms of unity of interest must focus on possible economic motivations that
may create divergent incentives between the two entities. See infra part I.A.
22 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 770-72.
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conduct is remarkable given the historic independence of physicians and
the tradition of de facto physician control over hospital decision mak-
ing.13 An important theme in the history of the American health care
industry has been the medical profession's efforts to preserve the eco-
nomic independence of physicians.24 Although government control has
23 Most studies suggest that effective control over hospital decisions is exercised
exclusively by medical staff physicians or jointly by administrators and physicians.
See PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 213-24 (2d ed. 1983); CHARLES
E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 233 (1992); Jeffrey A. Alexander et al., Effects of
Competition, Regulation and Corporatization on Hospital-Physician Relationships, 27
J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 220 (1986); Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit
the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1980); Kenneth W. Clarkson, Some
Implications of Property Rights in Hospital Management, 15 J.L. & ECON. 363 (1972);
Amitai Etzioni, Alternative Conceptions of Accountability, 55 Hosp. PROGRESS 34
(1974); Martin S. Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price
Dynamics, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 853 (1971); Marsha Goldfarb et al., Behavior of the
Multiproduct Firm: A Model of the Nonprofit Hospital System, 18 MED. CARE 185
(1980); Jeffrey E. Harris, The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some Economic
Implications, 8 BELL J. ECON. 467 (1977); Philip Jacobs, A Survey of Economic Mod-
els of Hospitals, 11 INQUIRY 83 (1977); Maw Lin Lee, A Conspicuous Production
Theory of Hospital Behavior, 38 S. ECON. REV. 48 (1971); Joseph P. Newhouse,
Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a Hospital, 60 AM.
ECON. REV. 64 (1970); Mark V. Pauly, Medical Staff Characteristics and Hospital
Costs, 13 J. HUM. RESOURCES 77 (Supp. 1978); Mark V. Pauly & Michael Redisch,
The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Physicians' Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 87
(1973); Michael A. Redisch, Physician Involvement in Hospital Decision Making, in
HOSPITAL COST CONTAINMENT 217 (Michael Zubkoff et al. eds., 1978); Noralou P.
Roos, Influencing the Health Care System: Policy Alternatives, 22 PUB. POL'Y 139
(1974); Richard B. Saltman & David W. Young, The Hospital Power Equilibrium: An
Alternative View of the Cost Containment Dilemma, 6 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
391 (1981); Sol S. Shalit, A Doctor-Hospital Cartel Theory, 50 J. Bus. 1 (1977).
24 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 3-29
(1982); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 445-47 (1988); Clark C. Hav-
ighurst, The Changing Locus of Decision Making in the Health Care Sector, 11 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 697, 700-05 (1986) [hereinafter Havighurst, Changing
Locus]; Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care
Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 307-19.
Organized medicine has advanced physicians' interests largely through the medical
profession's "private regulation" of the health care industry. This private and profes-
sional regulation of health care includes: (1) "the medical profession's power to spec-
ify the training required and other criteria for public or private recognition as a
qualified practitioner or technician," Havighurst, Changing Locus, supra, at 700,
through state licensing requirements, which incorporated the profession's standards;
(2) "professional advocacy of legal, and enforcement of ethical, bans on contract prac-
tice by physicians and the corporate practice of medicine, which effectively discour-
aged hospitals from employing physicians and retailing their services," id. at 703; (3)
specification of "the details of hospital organization and operation," id. at 704,
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constituted the most obvious threat to physician autonomy,25 the pros-
pect of corporate control through the commercialization of medicine has
been a source of constant concern to the profession.26 In an effort to
resist control by hospitals, insurance companies, and other corporations,
the profession adopted ethical guidelines-which were frequently incor-
porated into state law-designed to ensure that physicians would not
become subservient to corporate managers. For example, professional
codes of ethics forbade the "contract practice of medicine," thereby
preventing physicians from entering into contractual or employment rela-
tionships through which lay middlemen might profit from the delivery of
medical services. 27 The profession justified these ethical proscriptions on
the ground that lay intervention in the physician-patient relationship
might lead to consumer exploitation. 28  However, such proscriptions
through the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, a phy-
sician-dominated organization; (4) restrictions on physician supply, id.; and (5) estab-
lishing, and maintaining control over, financing mechanisms and suppression of
possible alternatives, id. at 705.
In 1975, the Supreme Court held that professional activities were not exempt from
antitrust scrutiny. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). This appeared
to be the end of systematic professional regulation of the health care industry.
Shortly' after Goldfarb, the FTC successfully challenged professional ethical prohibi-
tions against advertising, solicitation, and contract practice. American Medical Ass'n
v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 453 (2d Cir. 1980), afTd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S.
676 (1982). Courts have sustained government challenges to other manifestations of
physician regulation, such as boycotts of nonphysician providers, Wilk v. American
Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ill. 1987), physician control of health insur-
ance plans, Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 276
(4th Cir. 1980), and price fixing, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332 (1982); see Clark C. Havighurst, The Contributions of Antitrust Law to a Procom-
petitive Health Care Policy, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE 306-16 (Jack A.
Meyer ed., 1983) (discussing successful antitrust challenges that have undermined the
market power of health care providers). Nevertheless, the collective power of physi-
cians in hospitals generally remains intact despite frequent challenges in antitrust suits
involving the denial of clinical privileges to individual practitioners.
25 See, e.g., STARR, supra note 24, at 280-89 (recounting the history of organized
medicine's opposition to national health insurance in the 1940s).
26 Id. at 24-29.
27 See Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine:
An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 458-67
(1987) (examining the development of the corporate practice doctrine and recounting
the history of the profession's ethical restraints on corporate practice).
28 Id. at 467 (stating that commentators "generally advance three considerations"
supporting ethical proscriptions against the corporate practice of medicine: "(1) lay
control over professional judgment; (2) commercial exploitation of the medical prac-
tice; and (3) division of the physician's loyalty between patient and employer"); see
also American Medical Ass'n, 638 F.2d at 453 (prohibiting the American Medical
Association from imposing restraints on certain advertising, solicitation, and contrac-
[Vol. 74:67
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amounted to professionally enforced agreements among physicians not to
compete with each other by "wholesaling" their services at less than pre-
vailing prices."
Professional ethical standards also prohibited physicians from partici-
pating in health insurance plans that were not open to every physician in
a given community.3" The ethical principle ostensibly defending the con-
sumer's "free choice of provider" prevented insurance companies from
using their bargaining strength to subvert physicians' independence. It
prevented price competition by requiring that "each public or private
health insurer must deal with all [physicians] as a guild, and could not
split them into competing groups.",3 ' For consumers, the effect of the
contract practice and free choice rules was to prevent both hospitals and
insurance companies from offering integrated packages of health care
and financial protection.32 In the absence of integrated delivery systems,
the consumer's usual point of entry into the health care system was the
independent physician. As a result, physicians could exert leverage over
hospitals by threatening to take their patients elsewhere. 33
Although the proscriptions against contract practice and the require-
ment of free choice of provider are now of markedly diminished legal and
practical importance, 34 the professional independence they helped foster
remains ingrained in the organizational structure of most American hos-
pitals. In most hospitals the medical staff is composed of independent
practitioners who devote their primary attention to, and receive primary
tual practices of physicians); Hall, supra note 24, at 514-16 (criticizing courts that
employ policy arguments to enforce the prohibition of corporate practice).
29 Courts also enforced the restrictions through the legal doctrine forbidding the
"corporate practice of medicine." See Hall, supra note 24, at 509-18 (discussing the
history of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine).
30 Charles D. Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of Trade in American Health
Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351, 1356 (1984).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1355-59.
33 The physician's role as gatekeeper was crucial to professional power. See
STARR, supra note 24, at 26-27 ("The profession's [gatekeeping] authority puts at its
disposal the purchasing power of its patients.... [T]he physician's authority to decide
whether and where to hospitalize patients gives doctors great leverage over hospital
policy.").
31 See American Medical Ass'n, 638 F.2d at 453 (prohibiting the American Medical
Association from imposing restraints on certain advertising, solicitation, and contrac-
tual arrangements by physicians); Chase-Lubitz, supra note 27, at 475-88 (enumerat-
ing reasons for the decline of the corporate practice doctrine); Weller, supra note 30,
at 1374 (arguing that fundamental restructuring in the health care industry has over-
whelmed traditional free choice and ethics proscriptions). But see Hall, supra note 24,
at 516-18 (suggesting continued legal viability of the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine).
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economic benefit from, their private medical practices. 5 Independent
physicians have economic interests that sometimes diverge sharply from
those of the hospital. A physician's medical practice, his specialty, or the
profession generally, may benefit from the exclusion of a given practi-
tioner or class of practitioners from a hospital.36 Such exclusions may not
always be in the hospital's best interests.37
At most hospitals (i.e., those with medical staffs comprised largely of
independent physicians), then, the analogy between staff physicians and
conventional intraenterprise decision makers may be flawed because phy-
sicians have independent market interests that they may advance through
their decision-making role within the hospital enterprise. This is not to
say that all-or even a significant portion of-the decisions of a medical
staff comprised of independent physicians restrain trade illegally. In
order to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, concerted decision making must
result in an unreasonable restraint of trade.38 If a credentialing decision
promotes the hospital's legitimate, procompetitive interests, such as qual-
ity assurance, there is no serious doubt about its legality. Nevertheless,
such decisions, if made in whole or in part by independent physicians,
should not escape judicial scrutiny altogether.
B. The Role of the Governing Body in Medical Staff Decision Making
Intraenterprise decision making with respect to hospital staff privileges
may also fail the second requirement of the Copperweld exemption test-
that the parent firm have the ability to control decision making by its
agents.39 Staff physicians typically play a dual role within the hospital.
35 In some settings, such as teaching hospitals or hospitals owned by a staff model
health maintenance organization, the staff physicians may effectively be employees of
the hospital entity. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 11, at 42.
36 See Kissam et al., supra note 11, at 651-69 (discussing various forms of "physi-
cian cartel behavior").
37 Id.
38 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984)
(discussing the reach of § 1).
39 Id. at 771-72; Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 11, at 40-41. Although the Cop-
perweld opinion emphasizes the substantive nature of the analysis required in order
to determine whether a court should treat the actions of putative conspirators as facil-
itating the acts of a single economic entity, the mandated inquiry into "full control"
seems primarily concerned with management's formal ability to impose its policies if
it chooses to do so. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 772. The Court emphasized that anti-
trust law should determine neither the organizational structure of the firm, id. at 773,
nor the extent of supervision management may choose to exert over subordinate
departments, id. at 771-72.
In reality, independent staff physicians may exercise political and economic lever-
age that imposes a significant barrier to a governing body's exercise of formal deci-
sion-making power. See Kissam et al., supra note 11, at 607-11 (discussing control of
privilege decisions); Saltman & Young, supra note 23, at 407-09 (illustrating the role
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The physician's primary role is to provide patient care, usually with little
ongoing hospital supervision.4" Staff physicians also serve, however, in
certain managerial capacities within the hospital. It is within this context
that their decisions may give rise to antitrust claims. Hespital governing
bodies typically delegate important quality assurance functions, including
primary responsibility for credentialing decisions, to the hospital's medi-
cal staff.4 ' As a medical staff member, the individual physician partici-
pates in the staff and committee meetings in which credentialing
and control of the physician in the hospital). However, the Copperweld exemption
requires a complete unity of economic interest between the hospital and the medical
staff in addition to requiring that the hospital have the formal power to reverse medi-
cal staff decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 13-21. Thus, in those cases
when staff physicians' personal economic interests create a motive for them to make
use of political or economic leverage to prevent the hospital from asserting its formal
power, the Copperweld exemption from scrutiny will not be available because the
requisite unity of economic interest is not present. If physicians took steps outside the
peer review process to coerce the hospital governing body to accept their "recommen-
dations," the Copperweld defense would not apply because the physicians would not
be acting in their formal capacity as agents for the hospital. Cf Oltz v. St. Peter's
Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that physician not
acting as agent of hospital had sufficiently independent interests to permit a finding of
concerted conduct).
40 Traditionally, physicians and hospitals have operated independently in most
respects. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 11, at 15-16. Thus, they bill separately
for their respective services, id. at 16-17, and in many cases neither party is liable for
the other's negligence in connection with the delivery of services within the hospital,
see Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 (Ohio 1990) (explaining that a
physician's negligence does not automatically impose liability on the hospital). But
see Helaine W. Heydemann et al., Medical Malpractice, in 2 TREATISE ON HEALTH
CARE LAW § 12.01[3][a], at 12-10 to 12-11 (Michael G. Macdonald et al. eds., 1991)
(discussing hospital's liability for negligence in conferring staff privileges and moni-
toring physician performance, and discussing vicarious hospital liability for hospital-
based physicians). Physicians may be liable for acts of hospital employees in some
circumstances under the "borrowed servant" doctrine. See id. § 12.01[2][c], at 12-8 to
12-10. However, hospital liability for corporate negligence has expanded steadily
over time, and prospective payment and managed care have recently encouraged hos-
pitals actively to attempt to influence physicians' practice patterns. See Blumstein &
Sloan, supra note 11, at 17-18 (discussing the reduction of physician power relative to
hospitals). Nevertheless, treatment decisions are still made largely within the context
of an independent physician/patient relationship. See John D. Blum, Economic
Credentialing[:] A New Twist in Hospital Appraisal Processes, 12 J. LEG. MED. 427,
434, 459 (1991) (discussing the role of the medical staff in the credentialing process);
Peter M. Mellette, The Changing Focus of Peer Review Under Medicare, 20 U. RICH.
L. REV. 315, 316 (1986) (stating the importance of the physician's role in patient treat-
ment decisions). Thus, hospitals do not typically exercise full control over independ-
ent practitioners in their patient care function.
41 Blum, supra note 40, at 434.
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decisions are made.42 Unless the hospital governing body has the ability
to reverse decisions that fail to comport with hospital interests, Cop-
perweld's full control test 43 suggests that they should not be exempt from
§ 1 scrutiny.
1. Regulatory Constraints on Governing Body Control
The hospital's power over medical staff decision making is a complex
issue of fact. 4 In conventional firms, formal decision-making control is
vested in a board of directors representative of, and accountable to, the
corporation's shareholders.45 Similarly, hospital control is nominally
vested in the institution's governing body representing either the public,
in the case of a nonprofit or public hospital, or shareholders, in the case
of a proprietary hospital.4' However, the countervailing authority of the
medical staff limits the hospital governing body's managerial power. Typ-
ically, the respective bylaws of the medical staff and the governing body
formally delegate important aspects of hospital management to the medi-
cal staff and, strikingly, permit the medical staff to operate on a self-gov-
erning basis.47
42 Id. at 434-35.
41 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 772.
44 As suggested more fully below, it is inappropriate for courts to conclude that
hospital management is always in control of staff privileges decisions without careful
examination of the hospital's decision-making process. See infra part I.B.3.
45 See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr §§ 8.01, 8.08 (1984).
46 Hospital governance resembles that of other corporations in that managerial
authority is initially vested in a board of directors. Id. However, most courts have
held that a hospital board can limit its plenary managerial power contractually by
approving medical staff bylaws that cede certain prerogatives to the medical staff. See
McElhinney v. William Booth Memorial Hosp., 544 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Ky. 1976) (not-
ing that a public or private hospital must act in accordance with its charter and
bylaws); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 149 A.2d 456, 459 (Pa.
1959) (stating that staff bylaws, approved by the board of directors, are an integral
part of the contractual relation between the hospital and members of the medical
staff); St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical Ctr., 245 N.W.2d
472, 475 (S.D. 1976) (holding that medical staff bylaws, which were approved by med-
ical center and which delegated adoption of new bylaws to medical staff, were binding
upon the medical center). Some cases reject the characterization of medical staff
bylaws as a contract between the hospital and its medical staff by relying on a narrow
interpretation of bylaw provisions. See, e.g., Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360,
365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (stating that staff bylaws can form a binding contract
between the doctors and the hospital only when an intent by both parties to be bound
is found in the bylaws); Weary v. Baylor Univ. Hosp., 360 S.W.2d 895, 897-98 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1962) (stating that medical staff bylaws did not limit the governing board's
authority concerning physician reappointments, but also rejecting Berberian).
47 See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
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Determining whether the governing board is capable of exerting full
control48 over hospital decisions requires a precise, case-by-case under-
standing of the nature and extent both of the governing body's delegation
of managerial duties to the staff and of medical staff self-governance.
Each hospital adopts its own medical staff and governing body bylaws;
there is no prescribed form.49 Nevertheless, many states will not license a
hospital unless the hospital permits the medical staff to operate on a rela-
tively autonomous basis.50 Even in states where licensing laws impose no
such requirement, medical staff independence may be a practical neces-
sity. As discussed below, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO or Joint Commission), through its
accreditation criteria, requires hospitals to vest significant decision-mak-
ing power in their medical staffs.5 JCAHO accreditation is effectively
mandatory. The licensing laws of various states incorporate the JCAHO
standards, and Joint Commission accreditation is a precondition for par-
ticipation in many private and public third party insurance programs.
52
The Joint Commission denies that it has any interest in using its accred-
itation authority to affect the balance of power between hospital gov-
erning boards and staff physicians.5" Nevertheless, the JCAHO standards
48 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-72 (1984)
(requiring only that management be capable of exerting full control over decisions
made by alleged conspirators, not that it actually do so).
49 The California Medical Association has promulgated model medical staff
bylaws. See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MODEL MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS
(1985) [hereinafter CMA MODEL BYLAWS], reprinted in 1 HOWARD S. ROLAND &
BEATRICE L. ROLAND, HOSPITAL LEGAL FORMS, CHECKLISTS, AND GUIDELINES
exhibit 16-1 (1986). At one time, the Joint Commission was in the process of prepar-
ing standard bylaws, but this project was abandoned in the late 1970s.
50 Hall, supra note 24, at 529. For example, California law requires that the medi-
cal staff "be self-governing with respect to the professional work performed in the
hospital." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 32128 (West 1973 & Supp. 1993).
Although there are undoubtedly varying degrees of medical staff self-governance, it is
unlikely that California hospitals will permit the degree of governing body authority
required for a finding of unilateral action under Copperweld. See CMA MODEL
BYLAWS, supra note 49.
51 See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
52 Although accreditation by the Joint Commission is theoretically voluntary, it "is
either explicitly or implicitly a requirement for participation in many private or public
licensing, certification and financing programs." Timothy S. Jost, The Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public
Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 843 (1983) (examining the organization and history of
the JCAHO and analyzing its standards and accreditation programs); see id. at 843-45;
2 JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS 1993, ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 26 [hereinafter AMH].
53 Joint Commission President Dennis O'Leary, M.D. has disclaimed any intention
on the part of the JCAHO to use the accreditation process to foster physician power:
"In a patient-centered [accreditation] manual, standards would be meant to create
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appear to reflect the larger political struggle within the health care indus-
try over hospital control.54 Even though the hospital industry is well rep-
resented, the Joint Commission is composed predominantly of
representatives from physician groups,5" and it has apparently responded
to pressure from the medical profession to preserve medical staff power
within hospitals on at least two occasions.56
Accreditation requirements that divide decision-making authority
between hospital management and the medical staff reflect the organiza-
tional tension within the Joint Commission. 7 The JCAHO standards
require, for example, that medical staff bylaws "establish a framework for
self-governance of medical staff activities and accountability to the gov-
erning body."58  In credentialing decisions, the governing body is
"responsible for the final decision,"59 but that decision must be "based
on" the recommendation of the medical staff,6" which "has overall
responsibility for the quality of professional services provided by individ-
protections for patients but not for anybody else. People who have a stake in how a
hospital is run-physicians, executives, even governing body members-should not
be turning to the Joint Commission for protection." Dennis O'Leary: Toward Inte-
grated Leadership, TRUSTEE, Apr. 1988, at 10, 12 [hereinafter O'Leary].
54 Both the hospital industry and the medical profession have been concerned
about the balance of power within hospitals. In 1984, the American Hospital Associa-
tion and the American Medical Association brought together ten lawyers represent-
ing industry and professional interests who issued a report "written for those who
recognize that the unique and complex aspects of health care delivery in the hospital
setting frequently prevent application of traditional 'organizational chart' solutions to
many ... issues that may arise" and also for those "who believe that a cooperative
approach to problem solving, consistent with the discharge of legal responsibilities, is
preferable and necessary in today's environment." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION-AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION JOINT TASK FORCE REPORT (1985),
reprinted in CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS,
NOTES, AND QUESTIONS 556 (1988). The Report specifically denies any intention to
set forth the legal rights between the hospital and medical staff with respect to hospi-
tal governance, However, it contains a remarkably specific allocation of decision-
making authority with respect to a wide range of hospital decisions. See id.
55 See Jost, supra note 52, at 840 (describing the membership of the JCAHO).
56 See AMA Convention Medical Staff Highlights, HOSPITALS, Aug. 5, 1987, at 58;
see also 1 AMH, supra note 52, MS.3.1, at 58 (medical staff power over bylaws);
O'Leary, supra note 53, at 10 (self-governance of medical staff). Dr. O'Leary
described the conflict between the hospital industry and the medical profession over
the JCAHO standards as "a classic situation in which a standard could be justified on
the basis of promoting high-quality care but could also be suspected of serving the
interests of physicians." Id.
57 1 AMH, supra note 52, MS.3.1, at 58 (stating that neither the medical staff nor
the governing body "may unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws").
58 Id. MS.3.2, at 58 (emphasis added).




uals with clinical privileges, as well as the responsibility of accounting
therefor to the governing body."'" Thus, the JCAHO does not overtly
require either that the hospital or the medical staff be the substantive
decision, maker with respect to medical staff privileges decisions.62
Instead, the formal balance of power within each hospital turns on the
more specific accreditation requirements with respect to procedures for
granting clinical privileges, as these requirements are interpreted in hos-
pital and medical staff bylaws.6"
Accreditation requirements clearly contemplate that the credentialing
process will begin with medical staff evaluation of the applicant.64
Although the medical staff's action with respect to applications for
clinical privileges is merely a "recommendation,"65 one should not infer
that the governing body can freely disregard the staff's action. The scor-
ing guidelines promulgated by the Joint Commission in conjunction with
accreditation standards may be fairly read to limit the governing body's
ability to make its own independent factual investigations.66 Moreover,
while the JCAHO acknowledges that "[t]he governing body is not bound
by the medical staff recommendations but has the ultimate authority to
render a decision,, 67 it states that the governing body's decision "must be
guided by legitimate patient care considerations, medical staff bylaws,
61 Id. MS.1, at 53.
62 Id.
63 Id. MS.2.1, at 53.
64 Id. MS.2.12, at 56 (stating that governing body makes its "final decision, based
on medical staff recommendation").
65 Id.
66 2 id. at 26 ("Scoring Guidelines"). These guidelines clarify the intent of
MS.2.12, which provides that "[t]he governing body is responsible for the final deci-
sion, based on medical staff recommendations, regarding an individual's appointment
or reappointment to the medical staff" Id. at 25. According to the Scoring Guide-
lines, under MS.2.12 the governing body should "review recommendations made by
the medical staff executive committee, the documentation on which recommendations
are based, and records of any hearings or appeals addressing adverse decisions for the
applicant." Id. at 26. Apparently this statement does not preclude the governing
body's consideration of additional facts. However, the next sentence states that "[t]he
governing body's decision is based on the information submitted." Id. Although
there is no explicit requirement that the decision be based wholly on such informa-
tion, this sentence could be read to preclude the governing body's reversal of a medi-
cal staff decision based on matters extraneous to the documentation submitted by the
medical staff. Presumably such a decision would not be sufficiently "based on" medi-
cal staff recommendations.
Although the statements appearing above are found in the Scoring Guidelines, they
are apparently binding since they appear as expressions of the intent behind the
JCAHO standards, and thus they would not have the nonbinding character of the
scoring guidelines. See id. at vi (stating that the intent of the standards must always
be met).
67 Id. at 26.
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and rules and regulations"6 and may be "neither arbitrary, capricious,
discriminatory nor contrary to the bylaws."69 Finally, in a particularly
noteworthy expression of medical staff power, accreditation requirements
provide that if the governing body rejects a medical staff recommenda-
tion, the difference of opinion must be "resolved within a reasonable
period of time,"70 usually by a joint conference committee consisting of
representatives of both the medical staff and the governing body.
71 If
medical staff bylaws constrain governing body review of medical staff
decision making by limiting governing body review to the record gener-
ated by the medical staff and the policies and procedures set forth in
medical staff bylaws, the hospital board may not be capable of making an
independent decision in the hospital's interests. Instead, the board may
serve merely as a procedural check against medical staff misconduct in
the credentialing process. Indeed, a common view is that the governing
body's role should be limited in precisely this way.72 If hospital and med-
68 Id. The Scoring Guidelines also suggest that the hospital may inject its own
"reasonable" criteria into the credentialing process:
The hospital may elect to add other reasonable criteria, such as the ability to
provide adequate facilities and support services for the applicant and the appli-
cant's patients, and patient care needs for additional staff members with the
applicant's skill and training, current evidence of adequate professional liability
insurance, and the applicant's geographic location. When additional criteria are
specified in the medical staff bylaws, their uniform application is documented in
credentials files.
Id. at 9. The last sentence of this quotation suggests that the criteria added by the
hospital need not be included in the medical staff bylaws. This provision is significant
since incorporation of such standards into the medical staff bylaws would require
medical staff approval. 1 id. MS.3.2, at 58. Thus, the accreditation standards do not
appear to require the medical staff's consent to additional criteria that are deemed
"reasonable" by the Joint Commission. If the provision permitting hospitals to add
"reasonable" criteria is read together with the requirement that governing body deci-
sions be "guided by legitimate patient care considerations, medical staff bylaws, and
rules and regulations," 2 id. at 26, it may be inferred that the "reasonableness" of
hospital requirements not approved by the medical staff is determined solely by refer-
ence to patient care considerations. It is unclear whether "patient care considera-
tions" encompass consideration of the financial well-being of the hospital. Given the
prominence of economic credentialing in current discussions about hospital govern-
ance, it seems unlikely that the ambiguity is inadvertent. See infra text accompanying
notes 76-77 (discussing economic credentialing).
69 2 id. at 26.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 An American Hospital Association publication prepared specifically for dissem-
ination to hospital trustees described governing body and medical staff roles as
follows:
Appointment and privilege delineation are separate processes in which the board
and medical staff work together to reach decisions that are in the best interest of
the hospital and the community. The medical staff is responsible for assessing
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ical staff bylaws restrict the governing body's role in credentialing deci-
sions to procedural review, Copperweld's full control requirement will
not be satisfied.
2. Regulatory Constraints and Hospital Interests
The degree to which accreditation requirements may constrain the gov-
erning body's ability to make its own decisions on staff privileges matters
may be illustrated by examining whether a hospital board operating in
accordance with the JCAHO standards could decide to implement two
widely discussed innovations in credentialing: (1) the use of external peer
reviewers; and (2) the use of measures of the economic effects of physi-
cian practice patterns on the hospital as a criterion for privileges
decisions.
The JCAHO standards may fairly be read to prohibit a governing
body's unilateral decision to retain an external peer reviewer in order to
obtain additional information about a medical staff applicant. Under the
standards, a hospital board may not base credentialing decisions on infor-
mation the medical staff has not reviewed. The governing board may
base its decision on external review only if provided for in the medical
staff bylaws and only if the results of the external review were considered
by the staff in its recommendation to the governing body.73 One impor-
tant use of outside evaluators is to review medical staff decisions in cir-
cumstances in which the board suspects possible anticompetitive
motivation on the staff's part.74 The board may reasonably wish to
reserve the right to use outside personnel in such instances without prior
medical staff review.75 JCAHO standards, however, would appear to
prevent it from doing so.
Joint Commission standards may also effectively prevent the use of
measures of the economic effects of physician practice patterns on the
hospital without prior approval from the medical staff. As long as third-
each applicant's professional competence, performance, character and fitness and
making a recommendation to the governing board. It is the board's responsibility
to ensure that the medical staff has established and adhered to a meaningful, objec-
tive procedure.
James E. Orlikoff & Mary K. Totten, Medical Staff Appointments and Privileges: Key
Role of the Governing Board, TRUSTEE, Apr. 1988, at 14 (emphasis added); see also
Blum, supra note 40, at 434 ("[Tjhe actual credentialing decisionmaking functions are
carried out by the medical staff with the board's role being that of an overseer of the
process."); Mary K. Totten et al., Using Criteria for Medical Staff Reappointment,
TRUSTEE, Sept. 1990, at 13 (arguing that the board's most important quality assurance
responsibility is to ensure the appointment and retention of a qualified medical staff).
13 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
74 See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1120.
75 Cf Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 11, at 64 n.434 (suggesting that external peer
reviewers might reasonably be employed at the "appeals stage" envisioned under the
HCQIA).
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party payors reimbursed hospitals solely on the basis of the "reasonable
costs" incurred in the provision of hospital services, hospitals had little
reason for concern over the utilization patterns of staff physicians. With
the advent of prospective payment, however, a physician who practices
inefficiently can cost a hospital significant sums of money.76 JCAHO
standards suggest that a hospital needs prior medical staff approval
before implementing credentialing criteria that take into account the hos-
pital's economic interests." Given the apparent conflict of interests for
staff physicians, requiring medical staff consent presents a clear obstacle
to the implementation of a strategy designed to further legitimate hospi-
tal interests.
3. Evaluating the Effect of Regulatory Constraints
Courts should not merely assume that a hospital governing body does
or does not effectively control medical staff peer review decisions on the
basis of proof-texts found in accreditation requirements or in medical
staff or governing body bylaws.78 Instead, judges should examine the
practical effect of bylaw provisions on the nature of the governing body's
review and on the information available to the board during the review
process. 79 A court should also consider the nature of any obligation of
the governing body to account to the medical staff for a decision revers-
ing the staff's judgment.8" If such a process restricts the governing body's
ability to assert itself in credentialing decisions, or significantly delays81 or
otherwise threatens implementation of governing body policy, then the
hospital board lacks the control needed to justify immunity from antitrust
scrutiny under Copperweld.
76 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 40, at 429-30 (arguing that hospitals can lose profits if
physicians deliver inefficient medical care); Mary T. Koska, Hospital CEOs Divided
on Use of Economic Credentialing, HOSPITALS, Mar. 20, 1991, at 42, 48 (noting that
single physician's cases cost a hospital $215,000 annually in losses).
77 See supra note 68.
78 For example, a court may seize upon language to the effect that the governing
body is "responsible for the final [staff privileges] decision," 1 AMH, supra note 52,
MS.2.12, at 56, to support a finding that the hospital exercises full control over privi-
leges decisions.
79 See supra part I.B.1. Some hospital governing bodies wishing to take a more
aggressive posture in hospital governance may elect not to comply with all accredita-
tion standards concerning the peer review process or may interpret them liberally.
The Joint Commission does not require full compliance with each and every standard
in its Accreditation Manual as a condition for accreditation. 1 AMH, supra note 52, at
xxiv.
80 See 2 AMH, supra note 52, at 26.
81 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-72 (1984)
(noting that a parent "may assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to
act in the parent's best interests" (emphasis added)).
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To summarize, evaluating whether it is appropriate to treat intrahos-
pital decision making by the medical staff as the unilateral action of the
hospital under Copperweld involves two factual inquiries. The first
inquiry asks whether medical staff physicians have market interests sepa-
rate from those of the hospital, which in general might affect medical staff
decision making. When the staff consists primarily of independent physi-
cians, the divergence of economic interests is sufficiently plausible to jus-
tify scrutiny of resulting restraints for their anticompetitive effects. The
second inquiry involves careful investigation of the control the hospital
board exerts over the credentialing process. Because hospital bylaw pro-
visions purporting to place the "final decision" for staff privileges in the
hands of the governing body may actually hide the medical staff's influ-
ence, a court should make a careful examination of the credentialing pro-
cess with a focus on the governing body's ability to make its own decision
for its own reasons. If the hospital board lacks this fundamental power,
the control required by Copperweld is absent, and hospital credentialing
decisions should not enjoy the presumption that they represent the uni-
lateral interests of the hospital firm. 2
82 As discussed earlier, see supra note 6, courts are divided in their application of
intraenterprise conspiracy analysis to hospital decision making. Most courts that have
considered the issue have held that a hospital and its medical staff are incapable of
"vertical" conspiracy, but that medical staff members can conspire "horizontally"
among themselves.
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits distinguish between horizontal conspiracies
occurring within formal peer review proceedings and those that occur outside the
peer review process. For example, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it perceived "no
basis for holding that a hospital is legally incapable of conspiring with the members of
its medical staff." Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990). Nevertheless, it held that votes within the medical
staff committee structure did not constitute concerted action. The court stated:
That the members of the committees could conspire with each other and with
their hospital does not mean ... that every action taken by the committees and
hospital satisfies the contract, combination or conspiracy requirement of section
1 of the Sherman Act. To satisfy that requirement, Dr. Bolt must also prove that
the members actually did conspire.
Id. (emphasis added). To prove the existence of a conspiracy, plaintiffs must "pro-
duce evidence that tend[s] to exclude the possibility that the alleged co-conspirators
acted legitimately and independently" in making the peer review decision. Id. at 820;
see also Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 1519 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding that evidence of misconduct in peer review process supported infer-
ence of conspiracy).
The Bolt test is derived from the Supreme Court's holding in Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). The Monsanto test was formulated for
use in cases when there is only indirect or ambiguous evidence of concerted conduct.
Bolt, 891 F.2d at 819. There is no such ambiguity, however, when there is direct evi-
dence of the medical staff's concerted action in the form of votes taken in the peer
review process. Nor can staff physicians' participation in the peer review process be
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II. HOSPITALS AS JOINT VENTURES: THE IRRELEVANCE OF
INTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
Courts and commentators often assume that courts should employ
Copperweld's intraenterprise conspiracy analysis in evaluating staff privi-
leges cases under § 1.83 Copperweld, however, is arguably an inappropri-
ate starting point in the concerted action inquiry. Instead, the first issue
should be whether the hospital is sufficiently integrated to be classified as
a "single entity" for antitrust purposes. If the hospital is a combination
rather than a single actor, there is no reason to pursue the Copperweld
said to be unilateral in any meaningful sense. Indeed, no single staff physician would
typically have the power to exclude a physician from staff privileges without the
agreement of at least some of his colleagues. Moreover, there is no precedent for
concluding that decisions taken within formal structures, if made on the basis of
"independent" votes, are not subject to antitrust scrutiny. Cf. NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) (holding that conspiracy resulted
from actions of NCAA committee).
Putting aside the lack of precedent for the proposition that independent market
actors do not conspire when their agreements take the form of votes in an existing
structure, the relevant issue for the purposes of Copperweld is not whether an agree-
ment is "outside" the peer review process in the sense that it was not made during a
meeting held under the hospital's auspices. Instead, it is the subject matter of the
decision that is important. Copperweld applies only to decisions that are made by
intraenterprise actors in their capacity as agents for a firm. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at
769. Thus, if independent medical staff physicians engage in concerted conduct unre-
lated to managerial duties undertaken on behalf of the hospital, there is no basis for
concluding that Copperweld could serve to exempt their concerted action from scru-
tiny. Such conduct would be "outside" of the peer review process in the relevant
sense of being unrelated to the physicians' responsibilities as hospital agents. If the
subject matter of the agreement at issue relates to matters within the scope of the
medical staff's managerial authority, however, it should be irrelevant whether the
agreement was reached by vote in the formal setting of a medical staff committee
meeting or by handshake in some other setting. The relevant issue is whether actors
with divergent economic interests are engaged in concerted decision making. If so,
there is cause for concern about the potential anticompetitive consequences of their
decisions regardless of the process through which the decisions are made or the sub-
jective good faith of the individual participants. Conversely, when there is a complete
unity of economic interest between the medical staff and the hospital, and when the
hospital can, in any event, reverse decisions it finds unsatisfactory, informal consulta-
tion among the decision makers should not be chilled by the prospect of antitrust
scrutiny.
83 But see Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 812-13 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding a
medical staff a combination as a matter of law for purposes of § 1, but that a hospital
may not legally conspire with the staff); Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1110 n.120 (not-




inquiry; hospital actions would be subject to scrutiny under § 1 regardless
of the mechanics of intraenterprise decision making.
s4
A. The Hospital as Joint Venture
Antitrust law treats most business organizations as single, integrated
entities because once a firm begins to do business, its organizers and
employees usually retain no significant presence in the markets in which
the firm operates. 5 The firm's conduct is seen as unilateral and thus
exempt from § 1 scrutiny.
In contrast, unintegrated associations, such as trade associations and
cartels, are frequently organized and controlled by competitors to
advance the competitors' common interests. Each competitor retains an
individual presence in the market at which the association's activities are
aimed, and the organization typically involves neither significant integra-
tion of members' operations nor the introduction of any new product or
service. As a result, antitrust law disregards the formal unity of the asso-
ciation entity and treats its actions as the concerted conduct of its
members.86
Organizations in a third category, the joint venture, share characteris-
tics with both integrated firms and unintegrated associations. Like
associations, such organizations are usually competitor-controlled, but
they also partly integrate their owners' operations and typically introduce
a new product or service.
87
84 Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 214-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (holding Copperweld inapplicable when legally separate entities reach an
agreement), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
85 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1476 (1986).
86 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982)
(characterizing nonprofit medical foundation as a "combination" of member physi-
cians and the maximum fee schedule as "an agreement among hundreds of competing
doctors"); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) (characterizing professional society's ethical canon as "an agreement among
competitors"); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975) (describing
bar association's minimum fee schedule as "a classic illustration of price fixing"); see
also Rock, supra note 12, at 508 (describing antitrust law's "disregard for organiza-
tional form" and willingness to find conspiracy when "members of trade groups, pro-
fessional societies or standard-setting organizations are competitors").
87 See Compact v. Metropolitan Gov't, 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1574 (M.D. Tenn. 1984)
(defining a joint venture as a separate enterprise with integrated operations and sub-
ject to control by its parent firms); 1 ABA ANTITRUST SEcTION, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 372 (3d ed. 1992) (stating that a joint venture generally "embod[ies]
collaboration among business firms accompanied by some integration of resources,
management, and risk"); 7 AREEDA, supra note 85, $ 1478 ("Although it lacks precise
meaning or antitrust consequences, 'joint venture' usually refers to a research, pro-
duction or marketing enterprise created by several persons other than ordinary inves-
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Actions taken by joint ventures, like those of unintegrated associations,
are treated as the concerted conduct of the venturers."8 In practice, how-
ever, courts are less likely to find a joint venture's activities to be
anticompetitive than they are those of unintegrated associations.
Because joint ventures typically involve the introduction of new products
or services, courts tend to judge their activities deferentially, examining
any alleged restraints of trade in light of the venture's overall procompe-
titive effects.8 9 In antitrust parlance, restraints imposed by joint ventures
are treated as ancillary to the larger competitive purpose of the venture.
9 °
Thus, antitrust challenges to joint venture decisions are unlikely to
succeed.
When a hospital is managed in part by ceding power over medical mat-
ters to independent staff physicians, it may be plausibly characterized as a
joint venture between the hospital firm and the medical staff,9 ' and its
activities are thus subject to continuing scrutiny under § 1. Medical staff
tors. The creators may be actual competitors, potential competitors, potential buyer
and seller, or otherwise in 'related' businesses.").
88 See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-102 (1984)
(sports league); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (venture sell-
ing blanket licenses to musical compositions); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (venture developing private label grocery products); United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 351-54 (1967) (venture licensing rights to bedding
label); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1945) (newsgathering
venture). But see Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 356-57 (dictum) (char-
acterizing hypothetical productive joint venture as "single firm"); 7 AREEDA, supra
note 85, 1 1477-78 (proposing that joint ventures be treated as single entities "[t]o
the extent they are buying and selling in their own right").
89 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113-15 (analyzing restraints imposed by sports league in
light of procompetitive effects); Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356-57 (distinguishing joint
ventures from a naked price-fixing agreement); Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23 (stat-
ing that joint ventures are not usually unlawful as price-fixing schemes when a price
agreement is necessary to market a new product). But see Topco, 405 U.S. at 608
(treating joint venture's territorial allocation as a per se antitrust violation); Sealy, 388
U.S. at 356 (treating joint venture's price-fixing as per se violation); see also Havig-
hurst, supra note 4, at 1093 (stating that the hospital/staff arrangement is efficient and
thus has a procompetitive effect).
90 See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 224-30 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (finding that ancillary restraints created by a joint venture did not violate
§ 1), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) ("To be ancillary, and hence exempt from a per se rule,
an agreement eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral to a sepa-
rate, legitimate transaction."), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
91 See generally Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1126-31 (arguing for limited judicial
scrutiny of decisions made by hospital/physician joint ventures if they can prove that
physicians do not dominate decision making).
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bylaws can be seen as the equivalent of a joint venture agreement,92 the
terms of which are roughly as follows: In exchange for the grant of
clinical privileges and hospital collaboration in treating patients, individ-
ual physicians agree to form a self-governing, unincorporated association
whose purpose is to supply managerial services to the hospital, drawing
on the unique expertise of the staff physicians.93
From a formal organizational perspective, characterizing the hospital
enterprise as a joint venture is counterintuitive. Joint venturers are usu-
ally co-owners of a business, whereas the medical staff in a hospital enter-
prise usually has no ownership interest. Even without formal ownership,
however, staff members have traditionally reaped tangible returns on
hospital capital.94 Most significantly, the value of the time a physician
spends on medical staff duties may be small compared with the value of
access to a hospital's capital-intensive facilities to treat patients.
Moreover, under the bylaws "contract" between the hospital and staff,
physicians are not subordinate to hospital management. Instead, a col-
laborative relationship exists. For example, a hospital usually must either
obtain physician consent or permit the medical staff to make an investiga-
tion before divesting a physician of clinical privileges.95 Although physi-
cian and hospital services are incompletely integrated, the time and
expertise physicians expend in connection with hospital managerial duties
92 See supra note 46 (describing medical staff bylaws as a contract between the
hospital and medical staff).
93 Alternatively, one might characterize the hospital as a single entity that has con-
tracted with the medical staff as an "outside agent" to provide managerial expertise.
Principals and their outside agents are capable of antitrust conspiracy. See Belfiore v.
New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177, 182 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that whether agent is
capable of conspiring with principal depends on "the number and nature of the
agent's functions .... whether the agent acts in its own interests ... and whether the
alleged coconspirators are in reality under the control of a single individual or
entity"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067 (1988); Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto
Corp., 769 F.2d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that an agent can engage in an anti-
trust conspiracy if the agent is acting for its own benefit); Tamaron Distrib. Corp. v.
Weiner, 418 F.2d 137, 139 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that the existence of an agency
relationship does not foreclose a violation of § 1). When hospitals, however, do not
retain plenary power to reverse medical staff decisions, the "outside agent" character-
ization seems less plausible. But see Brown v. Donco Enter., 783 F.2d 644, 646-47 (6th
Cir. 1986) (stating that attorneys can be held liable for conspiracy if they exceed advi-
sory role).
94 See Clark, supra note 23, at 1435-37 (explaining that physicians seek to maxi-
mize their incomes when deciding how hospital facilities are to be used); Pauly &
Redisch, supra note 23, at 88 (assuming physician control of the hospital to develop a
model in which the hospital operates to maximize each physician's income).
95 See supra text accompanying notes 57-72 (discussing division of control between
board and medical staff generally).
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creates competitive advantages for the hospital.96 The collaborative rela-
tionship between the hospital and its medical staff suggests that some
hospitals could be aptly characterized as joint ventures.
The medical staff entity itself also is properly analyzed as a joint ven-
ture.97 As noted above, the staff is a separate organization of physicians
who have organized themselves, at the behest of the hospital, for the pur-
pose of providing managerial and technical services.9" Staff physician
practices are not integrated with the staff's managerial activities. Never-
theless, the medical staff provides managerial and information services
that might not be provided in the absence of collaboration among staff
physicians.99 Thus, medical staff activities are properly considered the
concerted conduct of staff members, although any resulting restraints
should be judged in light of the procompetitive aspects of the venture.
100
B. Vicarious Liability for Medical Staff Misconduct
Ironically, once the medical staff is recognized as a combination of
potential conspirators, it may be unnecessary to decide whether the hos-
pital is a single entity or a joint venture.' If medical staff decision mak-
ing causes unreasonable anticompetitive effects, the hospital will not
escape responsibility in either case. If the hospital is a joint venture, it
follows that staff privileges decisions are the product of the venturers'
concerted conduct and are thus subject to § 1 scrutiny.'0 2 Alternatively, if
the hospital is a single entity, then a medical staff that is the substantive
decision maker in staff privileges matters is acting as the hospital's
agent.' 0 3 Under vicarious liability principles, hospitals are responsible for
any unreasonably anticompetitive restraints their agents impose.'
0 4
96 Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1093.
97 Id. at 1092-94.
98 This conception of the hospital/medical staff relationship is confirmed by recent
proposals providing for more explicit separation of the medical staff organization
from the hospital entity. See Stephen M. Shortell, The Medical Staff of the Future:
Replanting the Garden, 1 FRONTIERS HEALTH SERVICE MGMT. 3 (1985).
99 A hospital might hire full-time physician-administrators to perform the func-
tions of the medical staff, but there arguably are benefits to be gained from the more
direct input of physicians practicing in the various hospital departments provided by
the medical staff structure.
10o Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1093 & n.63 (characterizing restraints imposed by
medical staff as ancillary).
101 It may also be unnecessary to decide whether the hospital and its medical staff
are capable of entering into a "vertical" conspiracy.
102 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
103 See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1118 (noting vicarious liability of medical
staff).
104 See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556, 570-76 (1982) (holding a professional society vicariously liable for antitrust viola-
tions committed by its agents in the course of standard setting activity). See generally
[Vol. 74:67
ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY
Vicarious liability is justified because of the potential for anticompeti-
tive activity that results when the hospital delegates authority over staff
privileges matters to the medical staff.'"5 Hospitals can greatly minimize
the potential for anticompetitive conduct by ensuring that the medical
staff review process is designed to further hospital interests, specifically
by asserting the governing board's prerogative to make decisions
independent of the staff.'0 6 If the hospital management elects to delegate
decision-making authority to the staff without supplying checks on possi-
ble anticompetitive behavior, it should be accountable for resulting
misconduct. 
107
III. BACK TO BASICS: INDEPENDENT CONDUCT AS A DECISIVE
FACTOR IN ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY ANALYSIS
I argued in Part I that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine articu-
lated in Copperweld is an inappropriate basis for dismissing most anti-
trust actions arising out of hospital staff privileges decisions. The per se
exemption from scrutiny implicit in Copperweld should not be available
primarily because most medical staff physicians participating in peer
review have an independent market interest that might tempt them to
skew hospital decision making to their own advantage.'08 Moreover, as
noted in Part II, the Copperweld inquiry may be irrelevant when the hos-
pital is appropriately characterized as a joint venture between manage-
ment and the medical staff.
Staff privileges decision making need not always be treated as con-
certed conduct, however. In some hospitals the medical staff may play a
Dean M. Harris, Vicarious Antitrust Liability in the Health Care Field, 5 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 61, 105-12 (1982) (discussing the development of vicarious antitrust liability and
its application to the health care field). The characterization of the hospital as a joint
venture rather than a single entity would presumably be relevant when there is no
basis for vicarious liability because the medical staff did not make the credentialing
decision. If the hospital were a joint venture, the decision would be the product of
concerted conduct, but it would be evaluated as an ancillary, rather than a naked,
restraint. But see infra text accompanying notes 110-11 (arguing that joint venture
characterization is weakened when medical staff does not share decision-making
authority).
Characterizing the medical staff as an independent contractor would not relieve the
hospital of liability either. See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1118 n.144 (noting that a
hospital probably has a nondelegable responsibility to prevent antitrust violations).
105 See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 571 (justifying vicarious liability because standard-
setting organizations are "rife with opportunities for anticompetitive activity").
106 See id. at 570-71 (supporting the imposition of vicarious liability because the
principal placed its agents in a position to frustrate competition in an industry).
107 If courts only imposed liability on the hospital if it ratified the staff's decision, it
could avoid liability by purposefully remaining ignorant of staff conduct. See id. at
573 (noting that such a rule would promote anticompetitive ends).
108 See supra part I.A.
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truly advisory role in credentialing decisions, with the board making sub-
stantive decisions with an exclusive focus on the hospital's interests. In
such cases, it is reasonable to view the resulting decision as unilateral, not
because concerted conduct was legally impossible, but because it did not
occur in fact. Mere advisory recommendations of the staff do not create
any "agreement" between the hospital and the governing body. 0 a More-
over, a medical staff recommendation that the hospital board is under no
obligation to accept cannot be the effective cause of competitive injury."
0
Similarly, when the medical staff serves in a purely advisory capacity,
the characterization of the hospital as a joint venture becomes less plausi-
ble. Co-venturer status implies a co-equal rather than a subordinate
managerial role for the medical staff. When hospital management makes
its own decisions for its own reasons, the characterization of the hospital
as operating to serve the economic interests of both management and
staff physicians is likewise significantly weakened."'
109 See 2 MILES, supra note 11, § 10.05[2], at 10-49 to 10-50 (noting that having the
capability to conspire does not mean the participants did conspire, unless a conspiracy
is shown in fact); Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 11, at 72-73 n.509 (citing White v.
Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 102 (4th Cir. 1987)). But see Havighurst,
supra note 4, at 1126 ("[Tlhe evidence of decisionmaking independence that would
allow a hospital to escape application of the essential-facilities doctrine would not
normally be sufficient to overcome an allegation of a hospital/staff conspiracy."); id.
at 1126 n.177 ("Even though a hospital decision might be independent in the sense
that it was not delegated to the medical staff, it would not necessarily be wholly
unilateral.").
110 The Fourth Circuit has made an argument deceptively similar to the one in this
Article: "To speak of a conspiracy among a medical staff during the peer review pro-
cess is not very meaningful in antitrust terms if the staff lacks the final authority to
implement any agreement that it does reach." Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945
F.2d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992). The court's
statement begs the important question whether the board had the authority to imple-
ment unilaterally a privileges decision of its own choosing. See supra part I.B.1. If
not, then the board and the staff would be jointly responsible for the decision. Facts
in Oksanen, such as the board's threat that it would unilaterally evaluate Dr.
Oksanen's privileges if disciplinary action was not instituted, suggest that the hospital
board may, in fact, have made an independent decision. Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 701.
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that the mere fact that the board subsequently
acted on a recommendation from the medical staff does not necessitate a conclusion
that concerted action was present. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438,
1459 (11th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the court devoted little attention to determining
whether the facts before it were more consistent with an independent board decision
or a joint decision of the medical staff and the board. See id. at 1459 n.34.
111 As long as physicians can use the purchasing power of their patients as leverage
in negotiations with hospitals, hospitals are likely to accommodate physician interests
in the course of pursuing hospital interests. Such accommodation does not differ
materially from other arm's length relationships. Shifts toward integration of health
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A. The Significance of Hospital Independence
In Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Service Ass'n,"2z the Third Cir-
cuit focused on the independence of decisions taken by the board of
directors of Pennsylvania Blue Shield when the board had received
advice from health care providers with a potential competitive stake in
those decisions."13 The case involved a challenge to the price setting
mechanism that Blue Shield employed in connection with its prepaid den-
tal services plan.' 14 Under the plan, the company had agreed to pay for
dental services pursuant to a formula based on the "usual, customary and
reasonable" (UCR) charges of its providers." 5 The plaintiffs,11 several
dental associations and individual providers, alleged that dentists com-
prising a majority of two Blue Shield policy committees "conspired and
acted through Blue Shield, as their agent, to establish and implement the
UCR system.""' 7 In essence, they characterized Blue Cross as a conduit
through which the conspiring dentists effectuated their scheme to fix
prices.
118
The Third Circuit accepted the plaintiffs' analytical framework, noting
that "[t]o the extent that Blue Shield's establishment of the UCR reim-
bursement system might disguise or embody an agreement among com-
peting providers, its actions would come within the purview of § .""' It
held, however, that the facts of the case would not support this character-
ization. 20 Blue Shield's board was not composed primarily of health care
care finance and delivery are thus likely to reduce physician influence in hospitals.
See supra part I.A.
112 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984).
"13 Id. at 258.
"14 Id. at 253.
"15 Id. at 254.
116 Actually, the claim against Blue Shield was asserted as a third party claim by
one group of parties and a counterclaim by another. Id. at 258. For convenience, this
Article refers to all the parties asserting price fixing claims against Blue Shield as the
plaintiffs.
117 Id. at 256.
118 The court called the theory a "structural horizontal conspiracy with a vertical
link." Id. This conspiracy depended "upon proof that participating dentists, through
their majority membership on the two Blue Shield committees, actually controlled the
establishment of the UCR system implemented by Blue Shield." Id. (emphasis
added); see also Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1270-71 (4th Cir. 1983) (stat-
ing that physician control of plan, if proven, could indicate concerted action); Virginia
Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1980)
(affirming finding that physician control of Blue Cross plan was sufficient to subject
activities to scrutiny under § 1). A hospital medical staff that makes the real decisions
in the peer review process could be characterized as a "structural horizontal conspir-
acy" effectuated through the "vertical link" of the hospital.
119 Pennsylvania Dental, 745 F.2d at 257.
120 Id. at 258.
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providers,' 2 1 and only two of thirty-two members were dentists. 122 The
court conceded that if the dentist-controlled committees had been domi-
nant in the policy-making process, a conspiracy would have resulted. It
noted, however, that "majority membership on a committee, without
more, does not make out a prima facie case of structural economic con-
spiracy. The power and authority of that committee must be ana-
lyzed.' 123 Upon such analysis, the court concluded that the committees
"were advisory only, that they were constituted and utilized as a resource
to the board, that they participated in no activities anathematic to anti-
trust precepts, and rendered advice only when particularly solicited by
the board.'
124
Pennsylvania Dental thus suggests that when analysis of the power and
authority of a hospital medical staff reveals that the staff's function was
truly advisory to the hospital board, no concerted action exists under § 1.
Dismissal of a § 1 claim would be appropriate under such circumstances
even though Copperweld's "complete unity of economic interest"
requirement is unmet. 25 The capacity for concerted action between the
hospital and the staff would be present in such a case, but concerted con-
duct does not occur since the staff's recommendation is without actual
effect.
126
The significance that the Sherman Act attaches to the distinction
between concerted and unilateral activity forms the basis for the holdings
of both Copperweld and Pennsylvania Dental. There are subtle differ-
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.; see supra part I.B.1.
124 Pennsylvania Dental, 745 F.2d at 258. The plaintiffs had elicited the testimony
of a Blue Shield official who "could not remember any occasion when the policy com-
mittee's recommendation was not accepted by the board." Id. The court found this
evidence insufficient to foreclose summary judgment on the price-fixing claim
because the Blue Shield board nevertheless appeared to be pursuing its independent
interests. Id. Two of the three committee decisions, which formed the basis of the
complaint in the case were favorable recommendations of policies developed and
urged by management, rather than by the dentist-members of the committee, and the
third policy the committee favorably recommended was formulated by another com-
mittee apparently not under provider domination. Id. The court made its fundamen-
tal analysis of the claim quite explicit in its ultimate resolution of the issue:
Distilled to its essence, the question comes to this. Blue Shield, as a purchaser of
or ultimate payor for dental services, sought advice on the design and operation
of its dental program from committees composed primarily of practicing dentists.
To give advice when asked by the decisionmaker is not equivalent to being the
decisionmaker itself.
Id. at 258-59.
125 See supra part I.A.
126 However, a hospital board could only make an independent decision if it had




ences, however, in the appropriate standards for judging the capacity of
intraenterprise actors to conspire under Copperweld and determining
whether they actually did conspire under Pennsylvania Dental. Specifi-
cally, the "full control" aspect of the Copperweld test is concerned with
whether the parent firm has the full power to approve or disapprove deci-
sions of the intraenterprise conspirators. Pennsylvania Dental asks
whether this power was actually exercised. Thus, one can imagine a gov-
erning body, formally vested with plenary decision-making authority, that
merely "rubber stamps" medical staff decisions. Under the Copperweld
analysis, the hospital would satisfy the "full control" requirement,'27 even
though the medical staff, rather than the hospital, was the substantive
decision maker. In most cases, a court would properly view the resulting
decision as the product of a conspiracy between the medical staff and the
hospital.128 On the other hand, if a hospital governing body treats medi-
cal staff peer review evaluations as substantive recommendations and
makes the actual peer review decisions in light of hospital interests, no
agreement between the hospital and its medical staff exists, and § 1 will
not apply.
B. Putting Theory into Practice: Summary Judgment
Both hospitals and medical staff members can avoid vexatious antitrust
claims if hospitals are willing to treat medical staff judgments as advisory
and, perhaps more significantly, if physicians are willing to have their
judgments treated as advice. Given the complexity of hospital relation-
ships, however, the process through which governing body independence
is identified is worth considering in some detail.
A physician claiming that a staff privileges decision violated § 1 will
typically allege that he was wrongfully excluded from the medical staff as
a result of concerted decision making of the hospital board and medical
staff committees. The significance of such evidence depends, however, on
whether the hospital and medical staff bylaws and state law gave the hos-
pital board the authority to make a fully independent decision as to the
contested exclusion. If the board did have such authority, the fact that
both it and the medical staff voted to approve the plaintiff's exclusion will
127 Copperweld does not require that the hospital actually exercise its review
power. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-72 (1984)
(emphasizing management's formal ability to "assert full control at any moment if the
[staff] fails to act in [management's] best interests," rather than management's actual
assertion of that control).
128 Most hospitals are unlikely to meet Copperweld's "complete unity of interest"
requirement because staff physicians might have economic incentives to direct hospi-
tal decision making to their own competitive ends. Therefore, a finding of concerted
conduct would be appropriate. See supra part I.A.
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not, by itself, demonstrate the presence of concerted conduct.' 2 9 The evi-
dence would equally support two conflicting conclusions: (1) the board
actually treated the staff's decision only as a recommendation; or (2) the
board merely "rubber-stamped" the staff's decision without having exer-
cised any independent judgment. Because such evidence would fail to
create a factual issue regarding the existence of the conspiracy, the
excluded physician's claim would be unable to survive defendants' sum-
mary judgment motion.'
On the other hand, if the bylaws do not empower the hospital board to
act independently-even if they provide that the board makes the "final"
decisionl'l-it is clear that the challenged decision stems from concerted
action. Because the board lacked the legal authority to impose the chal-
lenged exclusion unilaterally, the resulting decision must be subject to
scrutiny on the merits under § 1.
In the case in which the hospital board in fact possessed the power to
make an independent decision, the plaintiff must "introduce additional
evidence sufficient to support a finding of ... conspiracy." '' l 2 The plain-
tiff might prove, for example, that the board has always followed the
staff's recommendation and argue that the board's decisions are thus not
meaningfully independent.' 33 Assuming the plaintiff succeeds in casting
genuine doubt on the board's independence, the defendants must show
that the challenged decision was, in fact, unilateral in order to avoid a
trial on the merits.
The test articulated in Pennsylvania Dental for determining the board's
independence in fact for the purpose of conspiracy doctrine requires
identifying the substantive decision maker.134 The crucial inquiry is thus
whether the board treated the medical staff's decision as a true recom-
mendation and made an independent decision after due consideration of
the hospital's interests. A hospital board could demonstrate that it, not
129 Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1459 (11th Cir. 1991)
("[T]hat the hospital board had before it recommendations from the medical staff and
that the radiologists were pleased with [the board's] ultimate decision is, standing
alone, insufficient to infer an antitrust conspiracy.").
130 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)
("[Aintitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence
in a § 1 case .... [C]onduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal
conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy."
(citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984))).
131 See supra part I.B.1. (arguing that the JCAHO's accreditation requirements
that hospital bylaws vest significant decision-making power in the medical staff limits
the hospital board's role in credentialing decisions to a procedural check against staff
misconduct).
132 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 n.8 (1984).
133 Cf Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1459 n.34 (rejecting such an argument on the basis of
hospital administrator's testimony to the contrary).
134 See supra part III.A.
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the medical staff, was the substantive decision maker by producing affida-
vits and other documents, such as minutes of governing body meetings,
reflecting that "privileges decisions were fully reviewed by either the full
board or a committee thereof."' 35 The board could also show that "the
evidence supporting the medical staff's recommendation was evaluated-
perhaps by outside evaluators-in light of the staff's possible conflict of
interest and that the board weighed hospital interests the staff was not in
a good position to consider."'3 6 A hospital should also produce evidence
of board attempts to verify key reasons given for the decision."' Simi-
larly, the court should consider the plausibility of the reasons the board
gives to justify its decision in light of hospital interests. 3 ' If the plaintiff
fails to present evidence that "tends to exclude the possibility" that the
hospital board acted independently, 3 9 a court should grant the defend-
135 Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1120. Professor Havighurst suggests that the inde-
pendence of the hospital governing board should prevent the invocation of the essen-
tial-facilities doctrine to scrutinize peer review decisions. Id. at 1117 (stating that
"[tihe availability to the plaintiff of the essential-facilities doctrine should hinge" on a
finding that the board did not act independently). Consequently, he devotes consid-
erable discussion to the appropriate factual inquiry into the board's independence.
Id. at 1120-22 (discussing evidence of procedural safeguards that would support a
finding of independence); id. at 1139-42 (offering hypothetical privileges decision case
and listing questions to be asked in determining the board's independence).
136 Id. at 1120; see also McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp. 899, 914 &
n.13 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that the hospital board's decision to grant defendant
physician exclusive practice rights in nuclear medicine had arisen from an outside
consultant's report made in light of the best interests of the hospital); Blumstein &
Sloan, supra note 11, at 64-65 (encouraging the use of outside consultants in connec-
tion with medical staff decisions).
137 Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1139 (discussing this type of evidence as relevant to
the determination of whether the hospital had merely rubber-stamped the medical
staff's decision).
138 Id. at 1140 (focusing specifically on the hospital's financial interests). The
framework for analysis suggested by Professor Kissam and his co-authors, which eval-
uates the relative interests of the hospital and medical staff in privileges decisions by
classifying them as made by a "physician cartel," "joint venture," or "employer hospi-
tal" may be useful in evaluating the plausibility of proffered reasons. See Kissam et
al., supra note 11, at 611-13 (explaining that these classifications serve as prima facie
assumptions about relationships between physicians and the hospital).
Note, however, that a judge can make the suggested evaluation based solely on the
pleadings and any existing record, consistent with the common practice in antitrust
litigation of using judicial presumptions about conduct of market actors. See 2 PHIL-
LIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW T 316a, at 58 (1978) ("[Tlhe
correct ultimate disposition of the case will often be adequately revealed by the pre-
trial record to a judge who confidently understands the substance of antitrust law,
including the various relevant presumptions .... "). See generally id. 314 (discussing
the utility of presumptions in the fact-finding process in antitrust law).
139 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
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ants' summary judgment motions on the procedural showing described
above.
140
Even if the plaintiff is initially unable to rebut the defendants' showing
of board independence, he may request that the court deny or continue
the motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(f) permits a court to deny or continue a sum-
mary judgment motion when the nonmoving party provides adequate
reasons for its inability to present facts sufficient to justify its opposi-
tion.'4 ' Typically, a party will invoke Rule 56(f) when the opponent is in
140 Professors Blumstein and Sloan acknowledge the relevance of board indepen-
dence to the conspiracy inquiry. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 11, at 72-73 n.509.
However, they focus on the independence of the hospital board primarily in connec-
tion with whether the challenged restraint should be analyzed as a vertical or a hori-
zontal agreement. Id. at 56. Blumstein and Sloan advocate a more exhaustive inquiry
into the board's independence than that suggested above, arguing that unless a sub-
stantive and functional inquiry into the hospital's independence is undertaken, the
independence inquiry will merely cause hospitals to leave an appropriate paper trail
in connection with staff privileges decisions without assuring that the hospital actually
took steps to resist undue medical hegemony. Id. at 60-61. Rather than accept at face
value evidence that the board considered privileges decisions in light of its own com-
petitive interests, they would require the hospital to proffer a business justification
(e.g., cost containment, promotion of an image of quality services) and to substantiate
the justification by demonstrating parallel efforts being made in other areas of hospi-
tal operation to achieve the articulated goal. Id. at 61-65.
The chief difficulty with this analysis is the significant burden it imposes. Reflecting
the understandable desire to avoid an erroneous conclusion in favor of the hospital,
the proposed analysis introduces another layer of difficult pretext inquiries into pro-
ceedings already overladen with them.
At present, when medical staff antitrust cases are decided on the merits, the issue is
usually whether the justifications for denial of privileges-typically quality concerns
based on the training or performance of a practitioner-were pretexts for anticompe-
titive activity. See, e.g., Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1988)
(remanding the case to jury trial to decide the factual issue of whether the "hospital's
revocation of [plaintiff's] privileges, although ostensibly for professional incompe-
tence and unprofessional conduct, was motivated by the anticompetitive purpose of
destroying plaintiff's competition or prospective competition"). Thus, courts and par-
ties engage in extensive discovery and litigation examining the validity of the medical
conclusions reached by the staff, the personal relationships of the actors involved, and
the economic motives for anticompetitive activity on the part of staff physicians.
Professors Blumstein and Sloan propose that courts should also embark upon a
purpose-based inquiry in connection with the question of hospital independence.
They anticipate the criticism that their proposal is unduly burdensome by noting that
a purpose-based inquiry is inevitable under the HCQIA. Blumstein & Sloan, supra
note 11, at 84 n.606.
141 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the [summary judgment]
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential
to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judg-
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sole possession of the evidence needed to oppose the motion. 142 An anti-
trust plaintiff may not, however, simply aver that he is without access to
the relevant facts. He must "show to the best of his ability what facts are
within [the defendants'] exclusive knowledge or control, what steps have
been taken to obtain the desired information pursuant to the discovery
procedures under the Rules, and that he wishes to take advantage of
these discovery procedures.'
' 4 3
A plaintiff is likely to make several arguments if he files a Rule 56(f)
motion in an antitrust case. First, the plaintiff is likely to attack the find-
ing of independence on historical grounds, arguing that the board has
"always" followed the staff's recommendations.144 The court's decision
to grant the plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion for additional discovery of evi-
dence with respect to past hospital decisions should depend on the
strength of the evidence the defendants offer in support of their conten-
tion of hospital independence. If the defendants present persuasive evi-
dence of hospital independence, the court may conclude that even if the
plaintiff correctly suggests that discovery will yield evidence that the
board has always or almost always followed medical staff recommenda-
tions, such evidence would not be sufficient to prevent summary judg-
ment. 45 For example, if the hospital employed a newly instituted policy
of using an outside consultant in disputed peer review decisions, or if the
hospital's interests in the decision were clearly evident, evidence of board
acquiescence to medical staff decisions in prior proceedings would proba-
bly be insufficient to foreclose summary judgment. However, such evi-
dence may suffice to create a factual issue if the hospital offers
procedural evidence that is relatively unconvincing.
ment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or deposi-
tions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
142 JAMES W. MOORE & JEREMY C. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
56.24, at 56-809 (2d ed. 1988) ("A typical situation for the application of Rule 56(f)
is where the opposing party cannot then present by affidavits facts essential to justify
his opposition, because knowledge of these facts is exclusively with or largely under
the control of the moving party.").
143 Id. 56.24, at 56-811; see also Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 777-81
(3d Cir. 1983) (upholding district court's consideration of motion for summary judg-
ment on present record on the grounds that plaintiff failed to file Rule 56(f) affidavit,
raised merely conjectural contentions that additional discovery would support its anti-
trust claim, and made largely irrelevant discovery requests); Contemporary Mission,
Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981) (similarly upholding
a summary judgment motion on the ground that plaintiff "merely restat[ed] the con-
clusory allegations contained in his complaint, and amplif[ied] them only with specu-
lation about what discovery might uncover").
144 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
145 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(stating that evidence in summary judgment proceeding must be considered in its fac-
tual context).
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Another likely means by which antitrust plaintiffs may attempt to cre-
ate a factual issue about the board's independence is to produce evidence
revealing the pretextual nature of the board's articulated reasons in sup-
port of the staff privileges decision.'46 A plaintiff may claim that the
articulated concern is unreasonable, perhaps asserting that the defend-
ants' allegations of incompetence are unfounded. Alternatively, the
plaintiff may assert that the hospital is not seriously concerned about the
interests it has articulated in support of its decision.'47
In the case in which the plaintiff argues that the hospital's articulated
concerns were unreasonable, a Rule 56(f) motion is generally not neces-
sary. The procedural protections accorded staff physicians usually
include the right to receive a written statement of the reasons for an
adverse decision.148 Moreover, the hospital's justification for its decision
should appear in the defendants' evidence supporting their claim that the
board acted independently in the decision-making process. In the event
that the hospital has not either provided a plain statement of the concerns
motivating its decision or granted the plaintiff access to the record upon
which the board decision was based, a court should permit discovery with
respect to these issues as a matter of course. 149 Once a plaintiff has
access to this written statement, he should generally be able to demon-
strate that the articulated concerns were unreasonable without further
discovery from the movant.
It is not clear, however, that such evidence would always create a genu-
ine issue of fact. Consider, for example, a case in which a hospital
revokes a physician's privileges on the basis of articulated concerns about
the quality of care the physician delivers. The physician may challenge
the board's independence on the ground that it was medically unreasona-
ble to conclude that he posed a threat to the quality of patient care within
the hospital. The hospital board minutes might reveal that the medical
staff recommendations were reviewed extensively in the first instance by
141 See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 821 (11th Cir.) (holding
that evidence demonstrating pretextual reason for staff privileges decision justifies an
inference of conspiracy), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990).
147 See supra notes 138, 140 (discussing the appropriate factual inquiries into a
hospital board's independence and its proffered justifications for denial of privileges).
148 See HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)(3)(D)(ii) (1988) (providing a physician the
right "to receive a written decision of the health care entity, including a statement of
the basis for the decision" as a precondition for limited immunity of the hospital and
other participants in the peer review process).
149 Antitrust law does not require procedural due process in medical staff privi-
leges cases. Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1132. However, fair procedures "demon-
strate ... that the hospital and its medical staff were jointly committed to evenhanded
application of objective criteria [and] aid the hospital board in exercising its
independent judgment on each personnel decision; indeed, the absence of procedures
facilitating effective oversight of staff actions might suggest that the hospital had abdi-
cated its decisionmaking function in favor of the medical staff .... ." Id. at 1132-33.
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a committee of the board and forwarded, in light of concerns about
potential conflicts of interest among medical staff members, to a well-
qualified outside reviewer who confirmed the staff's recommendation. In
addition, the hospital may be able to demonstrate numerous prior
instances in which it acted contrary to the recommendation of its medical
staff. Under such circumstances, it is doubtful that a plaintiff's proffer of
an expert who will disagree with the scientific conclusions upon which the
board relied will create an inference of concerted action. This may seem
counterintuitive given the prominence of factual disputes among experts
in modern litigation. Nevertheless, the ultimate inquiry is whether the
hospital acted independently after receiving the medical staff's recom-
mendation. Although evidence of a medical dispute over a practitioner's
incompetence considered "in isolation"'150 supports an inference of con-
certed activity,' 5 ' it must be "evaluated in its factual context."' 52 When
the hospital has introduced convincing evidence that it made an
independent decision, summary judgment should not be foreclosed.
15 3
Conversely, the defendants may offer much less impressive evidence of
hospital independence. For example, board meeting minutes might
reflect some independent consideration of the medical staff recommenda-
tion and a vague or barely plausible articulation of the hospital's interest
in the decision. A strong showing that the conclusions reached were sci-
entifically unreasonable might create an issue of fact as to whether collu-
150 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
151 See Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 821 (11th Cir.) (noting
that factfinder could infer illegitimate purpose if hospital and peer review committees
acted on the basis of unreasonable medical conclusions), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924
(1990).
152 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
153 See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 616-17 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that hospital's explanation for denying privileges to midwives-promoting
hospital as tertiary care center and high quality training and medical institution-
warranted summary judgment in favor of hospital), cert. denied sub nom. Nurse Mid-
wifery Assocs. v. Hendersonville Community Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Kreuzer v.
American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1495-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (find-
ing that summary judgment was appropriate because there was little evidence to sup-
port a conspiracy to restrain trade); Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosps., Inc., 703 F.2d
942, 947-48 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding summary judgment because petitioner did not
advance probative evidence in response to defendants' legitimate alternative explana-
tions for their conduct). Compare Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143-45 (3d
Cir. 1988), in which the plaintiff, Dr. Miller, introduced sufficient evidence, that the
defendants' quality concerns and Dr. Miller's dismissal for unprofessional conduct
were pretextual, to survive summary judgment. Specifically, Dr. Miller showed that
hospital management had long viewed him as a competitive threat, had taken actions
damaging to his practice, and had failed to discipline other physicians committing
offenses similar to those allegedly committed by Dr. Miller. Id. at 144. He also
alleged that the hearing process used to discipline him was irregular. Id.
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sion occurred. This is particularly true if the hospital's interests in the
decision appear relatively weak and those of the medical staff are particu-
larly strong, or if accompanying evidence of anticompetitive motivation
or conduct exists.1
5 4
Professors Blumstein and Sloan have suggested an alternative formula-
tion of the pretext argument. 155 Rather than attack the reasonableness of
record findings (e.g., quality, cost) in a particular case, an antitrust plain-
tiff could allege that the hospital's purported justifications were pretex-
tual in view of evidence that the hospital has, in fact, no institutional
commitment to the articulated policies. It is hard to deny the relevance
of such evidence. Nevertheless, in the absence of specific identification of
facts that proposed discovery may reveal, courts should not continue a
summary judgment motion to permit discovery on these issues. First,
such evidence may not be sufficiently probative to permit inference of
conspiratorial conduct.'5 6 Second, such an inquiry invites a focus on the
overall management of the institution. This increases the potential for
harassment of the hospital through exhaustive discovery of institutional
inconsistencies. From a judicial perspective, the time and expense associ-
ated with such an inquiry is probably unwarranted since such evidence,
even if obtained, will not necessarily demonstrate that the board was act-
ing as the pawn of the medical staff.
In the face of significant procedural evidence of independent action by
the hospital, it is unlikely that evidence showing inconsistent pursuit of
articulated objectives would permit an inference of conspiracy strong
enough to survive summary judgment. Therefore, if the plaintiff can
avoid summary judgment only by attempting to persuade the court to
permit additional discovery under Rule 56(f), the court should require a
specific showing of the facts that the plaintiff expects to develop through
discovery. 157 The court can then evaluate whether, in light of the board's
evidence of independence, it should forestall summary judgment even if
the evidence is as the plaintiff alleges. If the court permits discovery, it
can be focused on the specific issues that the plaintiff identifies.
158
154 Similar analyses are appropriate when the hospital's articulated interest in cost
containment is alleged to be pretextual. If a physician claims that discovery will
reveal that concerns about the physician's cost containment record were unjustified,
but evidence of hospital independence is strong, summary judgment is appropriate.
155 See supra note 140.
156 See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
158 The value of "focusing" discovery when a court requires plaintiffs to be specific
about the evidence they desire to discover through a Rule 56(f) motion is readily
apparent. The focusing process is illustrated in Glen Eden Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 740 F.2d 423, 427-28 (6th Cir. 1984). There, the plaintiff hospital
sought to prove that changes to Blue Cross's reimbursement policy, which were
clearly not initiated by its competitor hospitals, were nonetheless the product of the
hospitals' concerted action maintained by their right to veto such changes. In its Rule
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Focusing on whether the hospital board made an independent decision
thus seems to hold serious promise for disposing of nonmeritorious litiga-
tion at an early stage, while simultaneously permitting scrutiny of deci-
sion making occurring under suspicious circumstances. The conspiracy
issue unavoidably poses difficult questions of motivation and pretext, but
courts can isolate these questions in ways that force plaintiffs to come
forward with serious claims of collaboration before extensive judicial
inquiry is permitted.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that in the absence of a truly independent governing
board, hospital decision making on staff privileges questions should be
viewed as the product of concerted action and thus subject to scrutiny
under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Given the divergence of interests between
hospitals and their staff physicians and the long tradition of physician
dominance in hospitals, it is surprising that so many courts have been
willing to overlook the potential for anticompetitive activity inherent in
traditional hospital decision making concerning staff privileges.
Recognition of the potential of hospitals and their staff physicians to
engage in concerted conduct invites a shift in the focus in staff privileges
litigation to the hospital board's independence in the staff privileges deci-
sion-making process. However, some courts have been concerned that
antitrust scrutiny would prevent hospitals and staff from achieving legiti-
mate goals of peer review.' 59 Focusing on the independence of hospital
56(f) affidavit, the plaintiff sought information concerning the circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the initial reimbursement arrangements, and other informa-
tion related to Glen Eden's conspiracy allegations. Id. The Sixth Circuit reversed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment as an abuse of discretion, noting that the
information sought by the plaintiff was "identified with specificity," "not cumulative,"
and "directly related to [the plaintiff's] theory that participating hospitals either con-
trolled or greatly influenced the reimbursement policy of Blue Cross." Id. The court
continued: "If [the plaintiff] can show that the participating hospitals combined with
Blue Cross to establish the reimbursement formula... the ability of the.., hospitals
to block any change in the formula would be equally as important as the ability to
initiate changes ..... Id. at 428. But see id. at 429 (granting more generalized discov-
ery requests).
159 See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 704 (4th Cir. 1991)
(en banc).(noting that benefit of physician expertise in peer review could be lost if
potential antitrust liability accompanies participation in the peer review process), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).
Congress has explicitly considered whether the deterrent effect of antitrust litiga-
tion justifies exempting peer review decisions from antitrust scrutiny. In enacting the
HCQIA, Congress enacted explicit statutory findings that "[t]he threat of private
money damage liability ... including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust
law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional
peer review." 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (1988). Congress further found that "[t]here is an
19941
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
board decision making preserves conspiracy doctrine's focus on scrutiny
of competitive collaboration while providing a means by which hospitals
and physicians can avoid liability.
Preserving judicial scrutiny of staff privileges decision making that is
not reflective of independent hospital interests is also good antitrust pol-
icy. Consumers rely on hospital credentialing decisions in evaluating the
quality and efficiency of the medical services they purchase. Staff privi-
leges decisions based on the market interests of self-interested physicians
may endanger the integrity of this credentialing process. Moreover, phy-
sicians may use their control over access to hospital facilities as a mecha-
nism to facilitate other anticompetitive activity-such as blocking
innovations in health care delivery and finance that might benefit con-
sumers at the expense of the medical profession. 6 '
Suppose, for example, that a hospital wished to employ a strategy of
using nonphysician personnel when possible to contain costs. Because
the medical staff must approve and delineate the clinical privileges of
such personnel, the staff could effectively prevent the implementation of
such a program. Medical staff decision making may thus prevent con-
sumers from availing themselves of care that might be of lower quality
than that rendered by physicians, though at less cost.
Nevertheless, physicians may defend medical staff interference with
consumer choice on the ground that it is appropriate for the medical staff
to foreclose some options because consumers lack the information
required to evaluate the potential dangers the options pose. Thus, the
medical staff may have acted in the consumer's interests by rejecting the
proposed hospital program. There are two problems with this argument,
however. First, the legitimacy of "private regulation" by a self-appointed
body of professionals is open to serious question.' 61 Second, even if such
overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging
in effective professional peer review." Id. § 11101(5). Even so, the immunity Con-
gress ultimately created was carefully limited. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111-12, 11115,
11151 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). For a discussion of statutory immunity under the
HCQIA, see Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 733-34 (9th Cir. 1992); Smith v.
Ricks, 798 F. Supp. 605, 609-12 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health System,
789 F. Supp. 1054, 1061-65 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Havighurst, supra note 2, at 1161-62
(reviewing the limits of immunity under the HCQIA).
Congress's rejection of more sweeping immunity in the face of its findings suggests
that courts should be slow to look for ways to create a broader exemption. As Profes-
sors Blumstein and Sloan have pointed out, the immunity accorded by the HCQIA
also reflects a congressional assumption that participants in hospital peer review are
capable of concerted action under § 1. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 11, at 45 n.273.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
161 See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 464 (1941) (holding that
rules and regulations by manufacturers of textiles and women's garments that ordered




physicians do regulate themselves it is not clear whether the medical
staff's evaluation of the quality issues at-stake favors consumers' best
interests or the competitive interests of physician decision makers. Rec-
ognition of medical staff decision making as concerted action permits
courts to use antitrust law to investigate this question. Foreclosing anti-
trust scrutiny amounts to a conclusive presumption that professional reg-
ulation always benefits consumers.
Additionally, if physicians knew medical staff-dominated peer review
decisions were subject to antitrust scrutiny, the specter of antitrust liabil-
ity might create greater physician willingness to submit to hospital
authority, as well as greater hospital ability to assert it. There is a strong
argument that transferring credentialing and other important decisions
currently in physician hands to the hospital board would better serve con-
sumer interests in balancing cost and quality concerns. Hospitals compet-
ing for patients will rationally place appropriate emphasis on quality of
care, as this will no doubt continue to be an important basis on which
consumers select facilities. Presumably, hospitals will wish to continue to
obtain the views of medical staff members with respect to staff privileges
and other decisions important to the quality of hospital care. In addition,
hospitals face direct liability for negligence in credentialing and vicarious
liability for employee malpractice. 162 However, properly advised hospi-
tals may be more likely than staff physicians to serve consumers' interests
as staff privileges decision makers because of the conflict of interests that
physician staff members inevitably face.' 63 When staff privileges deci-
sions threaten physician interests, physicians may tend to overemphasize
differentials in the quality of services provided by physicians in compari-
son with less expensive nonphysician practitioners. Hospitals, on the
other hand, may serve consumers' interests more faithfully by balancing
quality and cost concerns.1
64
Physician control over credentialing decisions may also unduly increase
hospital costs. The federal government's policy of prospective payment
for Medicare services has imposed potentially severe consequences on
hospitals that fail to keep costs down. Perhaps more importantly, hospi-
tals are increasingly participating in provider networks that compete for
health plan patients in significant part by offering low prices. However, it
is primarily the physician, not the hospital, who determines which hospi-
tal services will be employed in the treatment of a given patient. Thus,
physicians who do not practice in a cost-effective manner may threaten
the economic viability of the hospital. Even so, in many hospitals, the
medical staff could likely block implementation of a credentialing process
162 See supra note 40.
163 Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1104.
164 Id. at 1160-61.
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that incorporated the economic interests of the hospital.165 Physicians
also have an incentive to encourage underutilization of hospital facilities
for their greater convenience. Staff privileges decisions made on the
basis of the competitive interests of hospitals, rather than physician con-
cerns, would result in more efficient use of hospital facilities, which could
benefit consumers through lower prices without appreciable sacrifices in
quality of care.'
Similarly, antitrust scrutiny might put pressure on public and private
regulators to permit greater innovation in hospital structure. The point
here is not that hospital governance should be changed to mandate less
physician input, but rather that hospitals should be free to innovate and
experiment with alternative forms.' 6 7 Consumers might favor hospitals
with traditional governing structures. It is possible, however, that by
adopting a structure bearing greater resemblance to that of traditional
firms, hospitals might achieve gains in the quality or cost-effectiveness of
services. Additionally, hospitals adopting an organizational structure
permitting hospital management greater latitude might find it easier to
compete in health care markets increasingly dominated by networks inte-
grating health care delivery and finance.
Finally, as noted above, if courts implement a clear rule making the
independence of the governing body's staff privileges decision the pri-
mary issue in determining whether concerted action is present in a given
case, hospitals and medical staffs could avoid antitrust scrutiny of peer
review decisions entirely by ensuring that medical staff actions on peer
review decisions were, in fact, merely recommendations. Thus, the threat
of antitrust liability would not be an inevitable by-product of engaging in
legitimate hospital quality assurance activities. On the contrary, physi-
cians could avoid liability entirely by consenting to a more modest, but
nevertheless important, role in hospital governance. 6 ' Given the incen-
tives for hospitals to maintain high standards of quality, there is little rea-
son to think that consumers would suffer as a result of placing plenary
decision-making power in the hospital board. In fact, consumers might
benefit from board decisions that permitted greater economy in the deliv-
ery of hospital services.
If the governing body shares or delegates outright hospital decision
making to the medical staff, resulting decisions should be subject to scru-
tiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Scrutinizing the competitive effects of
medical staff decisions does not suggest that either the decisions or the
165 Similarly, hospitals are liable for the malpractice of physicians whose privileges
are granted or continued as a result of medical staff negligence in the credentialing
process. It is anomalous that hospitals frequently bear responsibility for, but lack
control over, the credentialing process.
166 Hall, supra note 24, at 524.
167 See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 1082.
168 Id. at 1138-39.
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process through which they are reached is inherently unlawful. It merely
recognizes that concerted decision making among independent market
actors may, in some circumstances, pose a threat to competitive values.
Moreover, a clear rule requiring scrutiny of medical staff decision making
creates the potential for enhanced consumer welfare by creating an
important incentive for professionals to relax controls on hospital deci-
sion making, thereby facilitating potentially beneficial innovation.
The chilling effect that antitrust scrutiny threatens to impose upon hos-
pital peer review is an inadequate justification for refusing to apply the
antitrust laws to the hospital peer review process in a straightforward
manner. Hospitals and physicians can and should take reasonable steps
to minimize the potential that the independent competitive interests of
staff physicians will unduly influence medical staff decisions by ensuring
that the hospital, and not the medical staff, is the decision maker in peer
review matters. If they fail to do so, any resulting restraints on competi-
tion should be deemed the product of concerted conduct subject to anti-
trust scrutiny.

